Sunday, February 20, 2005
U.S. intelligence czar not a new idea
Based on what I’m reading in the newspapers, hearing on radio call-in shows, and gleaning from the flood of email messages received over the past week; many Americans believe the naming of Ambassador John Negroponte to the post of Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and Air Force Lt. Gen. Michael Hayden as deputy DNI is a brand new idea... or at least was conceived after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
As we all know, the DNI is responsible for overseeing the 15-member U.S. Intelligence Community. It’s a responsibility formerly held by the director of the Central Intelligence Agency (Director of Central Intelligence or DCI). But the idea of establishing the post of DNI - a so-called intelligence czar - is over three decades old.
So how about brief history lesson on the evolution of the intel czar idea?
THE SCHLESINGER REPORT
An independent, non-CIA overseer for the intelligence community (IC) was first proposed in 1971 by then-Deputy Director of the U.S. Office of Management and Budget James R. Schlesinger, who would become CIA director in 1973.
In December 1970, the idea began to germinate when President Nixon directed Schlesinger to examine how the organizational structure of the IC should be changed to bring about greater efficiency and effectiveness, short of legislation. The result was the 1971 “Schlesinger Report” (officially, A Review of the Intelligence Community), a 47-page critique of the IC, complete with recommendations for a basic reform of management that proposed the establishment of a DNI.
The report suggested that though there had been a marked increase in the size and expense of the IC over the years, there had also been an “apparent inability to achieve a commensurate improvement in the scope and overall quality of intelligence products.” Schlesinger noted that in many cases the IC was “unproductively” duplicating intelligence collection efforts, and that there was a failure at the planning level to coordinate the allocation of resources. He also cited the failure of policymakers to specify their needs to the producers of finished intelligence.
The report pointed to what Schlesinger saw as a lack of substantive, centralized leadership within the IC that could “consider the relationship between cost and output from a national perspective.” Schlesinger argued that this had resulted in a fragmented intelligence effort.
Schlesinger proposed the creation of a DNI position, thus freeing-up the DCI who would be responsible for reducing intelligence costs and increasing intelligence production and improving the quality of analysis.
Of course, the proposal was not successful.
CLARK CLIFFORD'S "DGI"
In 1976, the post of a Director of General Intelligence (DGI) was proposed by former Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford. Slightly different than a DNI, Clifford’s DGI would have served both as the President's chief adviser on all intelligence matters and as a principal point of contact for the Congressional intelligence committees.
ADMIRAL TURNER'S PROPOSAL
Then in 1985, CIA director Stansfield Turner proposed the creation of a DNI. According to Turner, “the two jobs, head of the CIA and head of the Intelligence Community, conflict. One person cannot do justice to both and fulfill the DCI's responsibilities to the President, the Congress, and the public as well.”
THE BOREN-McCURDY INITIATIVE
The idea was proposed again in 1992 as part of The Boren-McCurdy Initiative.
The initiative - launched by Senator David Boren, the chairman of The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and Congressman Dave McCurdy, the chairman of The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence - consisted of two separate bills (proposed by both lawmakers) that differed slightly, but were similar in overall content. Had the initiative passed, the DNI would have had the authority to program and reprogram intelligence funds and direct their expenditure throughout the IC. The DNI would also have been responsible for tasking intelligence organizations and temporarily transferring personnel from one agency to another as new requirements dictated.
Of course, the idea of establishing a DNI post has been on the front burner in a variety of circles since September 11, 2001. And we now have a DNI and a deputy DNI.
For more information, see my ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
"...an excellent reference source...engaging...practical...a useful addition to reference collections for all libraries."
--- American Reference Books Annual
"Smith's resource contains little known facts that will delight and entertain...tight, well-organized information presented in an easy-to-read format. Smith has compiled an exhaustive resource of CIA trivia that will answer some of the most obscure questions."
--- Florida Times-Union
"Engagingly written, the book is eminently readable and informative, not to mention fun to browse. It should draw the casual reader and researcher alike as a useful and convenient source of background information. As befitting a good reference title, little known facts will delight the curious...belongs in all libraries with strong current affairs collections."
--- Reference Reviews
As we all know, the DNI is responsible for overseeing the 15-member U.S. Intelligence Community. It’s a responsibility formerly held by the director of the Central Intelligence Agency (Director of Central Intelligence or DCI). But the idea of establishing the post of DNI - a so-called intelligence czar - is over three decades old.
So how about brief history lesson on the evolution of the intel czar idea?
THE SCHLESINGER REPORT
An independent, non-CIA overseer for the intelligence community (IC) was first proposed in 1971 by then-Deputy Director of the U.S. Office of Management and Budget James R. Schlesinger, who would become CIA director in 1973.
In December 1970, the idea began to germinate when President Nixon directed Schlesinger to examine how the organizational structure of the IC should be changed to bring about greater efficiency and effectiveness, short of legislation. The result was the 1971 “Schlesinger Report” (officially, A Review of the Intelligence Community), a 47-page critique of the IC, complete with recommendations for a basic reform of management that proposed the establishment of a DNI.
The report suggested that though there had been a marked increase in the size and expense of the IC over the years, there had also been an “apparent inability to achieve a commensurate improvement in the scope and overall quality of intelligence products.” Schlesinger noted that in many cases the IC was “unproductively” duplicating intelligence collection efforts, and that there was a failure at the planning level to coordinate the allocation of resources. He also cited the failure of policymakers to specify their needs to the producers of finished intelligence.
The report pointed to what Schlesinger saw as a lack of substantive, centralized leadership within the IC that could “consider the relationship between cost and output from a national perspective.” Schlesinger argued that this had resulted in a fragmented intelligence effort.
Schlesinger proposed the creation of a DNI position, thus freeing-up the DCI who would be responsible for reducing intelligence costs and increasing intelligence production and improving the quality of analysis.
Of course, the proposal was not successful.
CLARK CLIFFORD'S "DGI"
In 1976, the post of a Director of General Intelligence (DGI) was proposed by former Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford. Slightly different than a DNI, Clifford’s DGI would have served both as the President's chief adviser on all intelligence matters and as a principal point of contact for the Congressional intelligence committees.
ADMIRAL TURNER'S PROPOSAL
Then in 1985, CIA director Stansfield Turner proposed the creation of a DNI. According to Turner, “the two jobs, head of the CIA and head of the Intelligence Community, conflict. One person cannot do justice to both and fulfill the DCI's responsibilities to the President, the Congress, and the public as well.”
THE BOREN-McCURDY INITIATIVE
The idea was proposed again in 1992 as part of The Boren-McCurdy Initiative.
The initiative - launched by Senator David Boren, the chairman of The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and Congressman Dave McCurdy, the chairman of The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence - consisted of two separate bills (proposed by both lawmakers) that differed slightly, but were similar in overall content. Had the initiative passed, the DNI would have had the authority to program and reprogram intelligence funds and direct their expenditure throughout the IC. The DNI would also have been responsible for tasking intelligence organizations and temporarily transferring personnel from one agency to another as new requirements dictated.
Of course, the idea of establishing a DNI post has been on the front burner in a variety of circles since September 11, 2001. And we now have a DNI and a deputy DNI.
For more information, see my ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
"...an excellent reference source...engaging...practical...a useful addition to reference collections for all libraries."
--- American Reference Books Annual
"Smith's resource contains little known facts that will delight and entertain...tight, well-organized information presented in an easy-to-read format. Smith has compiled an exhaustive resource of CIA trivia that will answer some of the most obscure questions."
--- Florida Times-Union
"Engagingly written, the book is eminently readable and informative, not to mention fun to browse. It should draw the casual reader and researcher alike as a useful and convenient source of background information. As befitting a good reference title, little known facts will delight the curious...belongs in all libraries with strong current affairs collections."
--- Reference Reviews
# posted by W. Thomas Smith, Jr. @ 8:24 AM 
